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Deriving History from Law :
Are Cheques Traceable to the Talmud ?
Benjamin GEVA1
(Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto)
1. Introduction

Eminent historians single out the Talmud2 as being a unique legal
text in Antiquity providing for a framework facilitating at least a
1

LL. B, Heb. U of Jerusalem; LL. M, SJD, Harvard; Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall
Law School of York University, Toronto. This paper is part of a study on the legal
history of the payment order for which funding has been provided by a Major
Research Grant awarded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (SSHRCC), whose support I acknowledge with gratitude. Elie Zolty of the
2007 Osgoode graduating class provided invaluable research assistance beyond the
call of duty; I acknowledge with gratitude his thorough and meticulous research as
well as ongoing feedback. For research assistance at the final stage I am obliged to
both Joseph Salmon and Joseph Juda respectively of the 2009 and 2010 Osgoode
graduating classes. All errors are mine.
2
The Talmud is the summary of the oral law that evolved after centuries of postbiblical scholarly effort by the Jewish sages who lived in Eretz-Yisrael (Palestine,
being biblical Canaan, or Judea as it was until shortly after the turn of the Common
Era (CE)) and Babylonia (being present-day Iraq). It has two complementary
components; the Mishna, a book of law, and the extensive commentary, in the form
of an edited record of the discussions in the academies, known as Gemara. In
principle, each Mishnaic law is followed by the corresponding Gemara commentary,
so that both form the Talmudic text on a given point. The compilation of the Mishna
was completed in Eretz-Yisrael around 200 CE. There are two versions for the
Gemara, between which the one whose compilation was completed in Babylonia in
the fifth century CE (‘Talmud Bavli’) is the more authoritative one. The compilation
of the other version, known as the Jerusalem Talmud (‘Talmud Yerushalmi’) was
completed in Eretz-Yisrael in the fourth century CE. For an introduction, see e.g.
A.STEINSALTZ, The Talmud-The Steinsaltz Edition - A Reference Guide, New York
1989. According to A.STEINSALTZ, The Essential Talmud, New York 1976, p.3: « If
the Bible is the cornerstone of Judaism, then the Talmud is its central pillar ». Other
than indicated otherwise, the ensuing discussion is on the basis of the HebrewAramaic original text of the Talmud Bavli. English translation and comprehensive
commentary is published by Mesorah Publications Limited, the Artscroll
Series/Schottenstein Edition. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all Jewish law
sources cited and discussed in this chapter are in Hebrew.
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limited cheque system3. However, the Talmud does not provide for
adequate legal infrastructure for banking to develop; it prohibits the
taking of interest on loans 4, and further inhibits on the lending out of
deposits5. Banking is premised on lending for profit out of bank
deposits, and it is against the background of a thriving banking system
that one expects the development of a cheque, or in fact any non-cash
payment system6. Hence, the existence of a Talmudic cheque system
is counter-intuitive.
Certainly, a plain reading of a relevant Talmudic text may point
out to the possible existence of a cheque system. Nevertheless, a
rigorous analysis of this text, supported by traditional scholarly
3

See e.g. R.BOGAERT, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques, Leyde 1968,
p.340-341, fn.206, p.413, fn.7, and BOGAERT’S speech in a conference session
reproduced in (1977), 123 Reuve belge de numismatique et de sigillographie 265,
where he speaks of the cheque under the Talmud as an instrument of payment to
workers who according to Mosaic laws are to receive daily their wages. To a similar
effect see also J.ANDREAU, La vie financière dans le monde romain: les métiers de
manieurs d’argent, Rome 1987, p.562, J.ANDREAU, Banking and Business in the
Roman World, Cambridge 1999, [translated to English by J.LLOYD] p.42: « the use of
cheques is attested … in Canaan, following rulings made by Mosaic laws on the
payment of wages ». See also E.ASHTOR, “Banking Instruments Between the Muslim
East and the Christian West” (1972), in East-West Trade in the Medieval
Mediterranean, BZ.KEDAR (ed.) London: Variorum Reprints, 1986, 553, at p.555.
4
Prohibition is based on three biblical cites and exists for any transaction where a
party is obligated to deliver or pay in genre. These biblical verses are Exodus 22:24,
Leviticus 25:36-7, and Deuteronomy 23:20. R.BOGAERT, Les Origines antiques de la
banque de dépôt, Leyde 1966, p.157 acknowledges this factor as one that militated
against the development of banking among the Jews in Judea during the period under
discussion.
5
The principal text is Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.43A et seq. It gives the moneychanger
a limited right to use money deposited for safekeeping in an open bag but not to mix
the entire deposit with others. See B.GEVA, Bank Collections and Payment
Transactions: Comparative Study of Legal Aspects, Oxford 2001, p.67-71. Certainly,
if so agreed, and for a fee, the moneychanger could invest money deposited with him,
either for a depositor, or even under a joint venture with him, though in the latter
case, only under a mutual profit and loss sharing agreement. See Talmud, Bava
Metzia, pp.68a and 104b.
6
For the link among these three activities, namely, deposit-taking, lending and the
provision of payment services as underlying the origin of banking in Ancient Greece,
see: BOGAERT , Les Origines antiques de la banque de dépôt , supra n.4, p.137 -144:
To these days, « To be recognized as a bank … an institution is expected to receive
deposits of money from its customers; to maintain current accounts for them; to
provide advances in the form of loans or overdrafts; and to manage payments on
behalf of its customers … » E.GREEN, Banking — An Illustrated History, New
York 1989, p.11.
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commentaries, leads to a contrary conclusion. Based on a study of the
text and commentary, the present study makes the following
arguments:
1. While written legal documents are recognized by the Talmud,7
there is no indication supporting the existence of written cheques; at
the most, the alleged cheque system was oral. True, a cheque need not
necessarily be circulating which would have required writing, and yet,
lack of embodiment in paper is inconsistent with standardization
required for a ‘system’ to exist8.
2. While a cheque may be drawn against a line of credit, a cheque
system is typically associated with funds kept with depositaries,
which are withdrawn by cheque9. However, the Talmudic discussion
on the closest scenario to a cheque system is taken to relate to a
situation in which the paymaster extends credit to the debtor;
3. Presence of all three may be required for the renunciation of
recourse by a creditor against the debtor to whom a paymaster extends
credit. Presence of all three is however ill-fit to accommodate the
cheque mechanism, under which a cheque is issued by the debtor to
the creditor, and subsequently presented by the creditor to the
paymaster, without all three present at the same time in the same
place; and

7

See e.g. Talmud, Kiddushin, p.47B-48A (documentary debt) and Talmud, Bava
Kamma p.70A (the urcheta, being a written and properly witnessed authorization
given by a creditor to an emissary, turning him into an agent with the power to collect
from the creditor’s debtor money or chattel owed by that debtor to his creditor)
8
Contrast with the system for non-circulating and yet written cheques in GrecoRoman Egypt set out in R.S.BAGNALL and R.BOGAERT, Orders for Payment from a
Banker’s Archive: Papyri in the Collection of Florida State University (1975), in
R.BOGAERT, Trapezitica Aegyptiaca. Recueil de recherches sur la banque en Égypte
Gréco-Romaine, Firenze 1994, 219 at p.239, R.BOGAERT, Note sur l’emploi du
chéque dans l’Égypte ptolémaïque” (1983), in Trapezitica ibid. at p.245, R.BOGAERT,
Recherches sue la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine (1987-89), in Trapezitica ibid. 1
at p.23, R.BOGAERT, Les opérations des banques de l’ Égypte Ptolémaïque (1998), 29
Ancient Society 45, p.141.
9
In modern law the point is acknowledged in e.g. Article 3 of the Uniform Law on
Cheques (adopted on March 11, 1931 by the Second Geneva Convention on Bills of
Exchange) effectively providing that a cheque is usually: « drawn on a banker
holding funds at the disposal of the drawer… »
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4. The law that evolved in the Talmud to govern the situation under
discussion is inadequate to provide for a comprehensive satisfactory
scheme covering cheques, which would be atypical in light of the
thorough and meticulous analysis of the relevant scenario.
The main part of the article is an in-depth analysis of the Talmudic
passage and related Commentaries from which the existence of the
cheque is said to derive. The article develops the above-mentioned
arguments and concludes against the existence of cheques and a
cheque system under the Talmud.
2. Directing a Creditor to a Paymaster: the Bava Metzia Text
a. The Talmudic Text in Bava Metzia: Credit Extended by Paymaster

Biblical law requires an employer to pay wages that are due to a
worker for labour on the day services were rendered 10. In Bava
Metzia, the Mishna presents some qualifications to the prohibition
against delaying payment, one of which is the case where the
employer directed the worker to receive payment from a storekeeper
or moneychanger11. On this passage the Gemara asks whether the
worker has recourse against the employer or not. One sage, Rav
Shesheth would not allow the recourse, while another sage, Rabbah,
would permit it 12.
For lack of discussion on the points, it is safe to assume that
neither a pre-existing master agreement nor writing is required. Rashi
says that the scenario dealt with by the Mishna is that of an employer
directing to the storekeeper a worker who needs to purchase
provisions, and in which the employer instructs the storekeeper to sell
10

Leviticus 19:13. The Mishna, in Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.111A, applies this sameday payment requirement also to the rental payment due from a hirer to an owner of a
rented animal or utensils, so that the discussion below equally applies to the recourse
from the hirer by an owner of a rented animal or utensils who is to be paid by a
storekeeper or moneychanger.
11
Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.111A.
12
Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A. Both sages endeavour to rationalize their positions
on the Mishanic text itself. Thus, Rabbah asserts that in merely stating that the
employer is released from the transgression of the prohibition against withholding
payment, the Mishna is telling us that the employer is not released from the
responsibility to pay the worker. Conversely, Rav Shesheth asserts that in stating that
the employer is released from the transgression of the prohibition against withholding
payment, the Mishna is telling us that the employer no longer has any financial
obligation whatsoever.

ARE CHEQUES TRACEABLE TO THE TALMUD ?

31

the provisions to the worker, against the employer’s payment (or
reimbursement) obligation. In this setting, the storekeeper does not
pay to the worker any amount previously deposited with him or
otherwise owed by him to the employer; rather he extends credit to
the employer.
On the setting involving the moneychanger, Rashi is more
equivocal; he states that the employer instructs the moneychanger to
give the employer small-value coins for one large-value coin. This
sounds like a change transaction; presumably the employer is to pay a
large-value coin against the payment of wages to few workers, each
receiving his own wages in small-value coins. This could be
consistent with a simultaneous exchange in a money-change
transaction, as well as with an advance payment by the employer to
the moneychanger, or even with a deposit held by the moneychanger
for the employer, out of which payment to the worker is to be made. It
could however be equally consistent with the situation in which the
employer is to pay the large-value coin to the moneychanger at a later
date, which is not different from the employer’s obligation to pay the
storekeeper for the provisions sold to the worker. It is the symmetry
between the position of the storekeeper and moneychanger which
supports the conclusion that the moneychanger ought to be treated as
positioned in the same situation of the storekeeper, so as to be
regarded as extending credit.
Under the picture depicted by Rashi, credit is extended by either
the storekeeper or moneychanger in the form of actual payment,
whether in kind or in money, and not in a form of a guaranty
supporting the employer’s undertaking to make such payment in the
future. It is in this sense that the storekeeper or moneychanger acts in
the Bava Metzia text as a paymaster and not surety.
Commentators made no distinction between scenarios involving a
storekeeper or a moneychanger, and are taken to refer to both even
when they mention one only; in the present discussion, “paymaster” is
thus used to refer to either a storekeeper or moneychanger.
Furthermore, the credit extension interpretation has not been
challenged by commentators 13. Indeed, the position of the storekeeper
13

By “commentators”, I mean ‘authoritative commentators’ according to whom
authorized ruling is promulgated in Jewish law. For a dissenting modern scholarly
view on the point, drawn from historical parallels, see S.ALBECK, The Assignment of
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as extending credit 14, particularly in selling provisions against
deferred payment obligations15, is mentioned elsewhere in the
Talmud. In turn, the position of the moneychanger who regularly
deals in money matters16, as also acting as a moneylender, is more
obvious; elsewhere the Gemara refers to the employer who borrows
from a moneychanger to pay the wages of his workers in the
marketplace17. Presumably, in our scenario, by having the
disbursement of the loan directly made to the worker, rather than to
the employer who will then pay the worker, the employer may have
saved on administration, at least by bypassing the need to deal with
small-value coins to be paid to numerous workers18.
The conclusion that the paymaster extends credit to the employer
may be supported by viewing the Bava Metzia narrative as limited to
a situation where all three are required to be present together19. This is
so since in Gitin, the Gemara discusses the legal implications of an
instruction directed to a person who owes money to the instruction
giver, to make payment to a third person; in such a case, presence-ofall-three in one place is specifically required 20. This would cover the
case of the employer who directs a storekeeper or moneychanger who
owes money to him to make payment to the employer’s worker.
Hence, where presence of all three is required, a separate discussion
may be needed only for the case of the employer who directs his

Debt in the Talmud (1957), 26 Tarbiz 262, p.274-277 [in Hebrew], where he
specifically rejects the view of the early commentators (p.277, fn.39) and argues that
the scenario in the Bava Metzia narrative is in which the paymaster is instructed to
pay out of the employer’s deposit kept with him. Among the more recent
commentators, cf. TUR, Choshen Mishpat, Section 339, where the scenario is
described as one that even covers the case where paymaster owes nothing to the
employer. ALBECK’S position is further dealt with in infra n.21, n.23 and n.39.
14
See e.g. a general reference in Talmud, Kiddushin, p.40A.
15
See e.g. discussion on the storekeeper concerning his ledger, Talmud, Shevuot,
p.45A and the Jerusalem Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B (further dealt with in §2.e below),
where nevertheless the storekeeper ‘s books are not accorded great credibility.
Particularly see PNEI MOSHE on the Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud abovecaptioned page.
16
See in general, A.GULAK, The Moneychanger's Business According to Talmudic
Law (1931), 2 Tarbitz, p.154 [in Hebrew].
17
Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.46A.
18
See second paragraph above the one containing n.13 above.
19
On this point, see RIF on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68A (of Rif’s page numbering).
20
Talmud, Gitin, p.13B.
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worker to receive payment from a storekeeper or moneychanger who
does not owe money to him.
Obviously however, this does not prove the reverse, namely, that
presence-of-all-three is required in the Bava Metzia setting. It could
well be, indeed, that the consensus on viewing the paymaster as
extending of credit to the employer21 is not premised on a requirement
as to the presence of all three; rather it derives from an understanding
of the economic background. As indicated in the paragraph that
follows, support to the conclusion that as depositaries of money, who
owed money to their depositors, neither the moneychanger nor the
storekeeper acted as paymasters, may come from elsewhere in the
Talmud.
Certainly, the moneychanger was in the business of taking deposits
of money, and perhaps the storekeeper followed suit22. Yet, there is no
indication as to the economic function of the depositary as a
paymaster23. Indeed, an important observation can be made with
21

A modern departure from this consensus is by ALBECK, The Assignment of Debt in
the Talmud, supra n.13. He assumes that the presence of all three is not required in
the Bava Metzia narrative, but nevertheless argues that this text is concerned with the
case where the paymaster owes the money to the employer. ALBECK distinguishes
between the Bava Metzia scenario and the one in Gitin (see particularly ibid. p.276,
fn.38), by saying that the former is concerned with a payment order, rather than the
transfer of a debt owed by the paymaster, which is the concern in Gitin. In ALBECK’S
view, in the Bava Metzia setting, upon assuming the employer’s obligation to pay the
worker his wages, the paymaster became subject to the requirement not to delay
payment to the worker, and could not discharge himself by merely transferring to the
worker the debt he (the paymaster) owes to the employer. But as will be seen infra
n.39, there is a difficulty in theorizing the paymaster’s liability to the worker, where
the paymaster owed money to the employer. Nor does ALBECK explain lack of
immediate payment by the paymaster (who allegedly owes funds to the employer) or
why the worker’s consent to the alleged debt transfer does not excuse the prompt
payment obligation, all of which is addressed in §2.e below (which further supports
the presence-of-all-three requirement).
22
See Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.43A, discussed in §2.a above, where it is disputed as
to whether in terms of his permission to deal with deposited money and his
responsibility for its loss the storekeeper’s position is that of the moneychanger or of
a regular depositary. According to GULAK, The Moneychanger's Business According
to Talmudic Law, supra n.16, p.159, it may well be that moneychangers operated only
in large cities so that it was common for storekeepers to act as moneychangers in the
villages. This view can be drawn, for example, from Rava in Talmud, Bava Metzia,
p.52B.
23
With respect, I do not think sources put forward by GULAK, The Moneychanger's
Business According to Talmudic Law, supra n.16, p.158-159 and ALBECK, The
Assignment of Debt in the Talmud, supra n.13, p.276-277, support their conclusions
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regard to the abovementioned discussion in Gitin24, on the impact of
an instruction given to a person who owes money to the instruction
giver, to pay to a third party. The discussion is in general terms. It
refers to the three individuals anonymously, as “Reuven, Shimon, and
Levi”; it does not characterize them as employer, moneychanger or
storekeeper, and worker, as in the scenario under discussion in Bava
Metiza. Stated otherwise, in Gitin, the Gemara declines to refer to the
depositary-paymaster as a moneychanger or storekeeper; rather it
treats the depositary-paymaster as an anonymous “Shimon.” Thereby,
it possibly tells us that as a paymaster, the moneychanger or
storekeeper must have been taken to act as a credit extender and not a
debtor to the instruction giver.
In the final analysis, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the
plain Bava Metiza text which is quite equivocal as to whether it is
envisaged that all three must be present. True, in his commentary,
Rashi speaks of the employer as ‘cutting off the worker from him and
making him stand with the storekeeper25’; there is no indication in
Rashi’s description of the employer physically joining the worker and
the paymaster, so that all three are present together. Yet, this
interpretation is inconclusive; Rashi may use his words
metaphorically and simply refer to the employer’s intention to severe
the legal tie between him and the worker, and have it replaced by a
new direct legal relationship between the paymaster and the worker.
A cheque may be drawn on a line of credit, though typically it is
drawn on funds on deposit26. Even if tracing the early cheque to a
mechanism premised on the extension of credit is not fatal to
characterizing the mechanism as a cheque, it does not lend support to
this characterization. At the same time, presence of all three is
certainly inconsistent with the cheque transaction flow, under which a
cheque is issued by the debtor to the creditor and subsequently
presented to payment by the creditor to the paymaster not in the
presence of the debtor. Indeed, inasmuch as it specifically requires
to the contrary. Commentators cited throughout this Section have been of the view
that relevant sources deal with moneychanger or storekeeper extending credit and not
owing money to the employer.
24
Supra n.20.
25
Or in Hebrew, in English transliteration, ‘Nitko me-ezlo ve-he-emidahu ezel
chenvany’.
26
See supra n.9.
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presence of all three, the Gitin passage has not been viewed as dealing
with a cheque. Discussion on whether all three are required to be
present in the Bava Metzia passage is thus central to the thesis of this
article; discussion on the point will however be deferred to §2.e
below, when the legal underpinning of the disputation between Rav
Shesheth and Rabbah as well as other aspects of the factual scenario
are clarified.
b. Tosafot’s Commentary – Renunciation of Recourse

Commentators’ analysis evolves around the effectiveness of the
renunciation of the worker (creditor) against the employer (debtor) so
as to discharge the employer and not allow recourse by the worker
against him. Two principal issues are addressed. The first is whether
recourse is available also prior to, and irrespective of, the paymaster’s
default in payment. The second is the scope of the renunciation; here
the discussion focuses on whether effective renunciation is
conditional or absolute, whether it is express or implied, and whether
its effectiveness depends on the paymaster’s own obligation to pay.
As well, discussion evolves around various variations of the basic
‘incomplete’ scenario in our text.
Tosafot’s commentary to the Gemara in Bava Metiza27 contains a
most comprehensive discussion on the recourse issue. It is clear to
Tosafot that any impact on the worker’s recourse against the employer
stems from the worker’s consent to abide by the direction, or more
specifically, from the renunciation embodied in this consent. The
starting point of Tosafot is that the employer is liable to the worker to
pay the latter’s wages. The issue then is not recourse, which is
obviously available to the worker against the party liable to him;
rather, the issue is that of discharge, or loss of recourse, on the basis
of the worker’s renunciation. Hence, it is the scope of the
renunciation, and its effect to generate either an absolute or
conditional discharge, which preoccupies Tosafot’s discussion.
It is clear to Tosafot that no disputation could arise where
renunciation is accompanied by an act of kinyan, (meaning a
proprietary act). In such case, according to Tosafot, even Rabbah
would agree that renunciation is effective to generate a discharge so
that recourse has been lost. This is so under the general rule providing
for the enforceability of agreements for which the serious intention
27

Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.
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has been manifested by an act of kinyan28. Moreover, in Tosafot’s
view, there is no disputation as to the effectiveness of a renunciation
unaccompanied by an act of kinyan 29, except that in such a case its
scope and requirements have to be more carefully scrutinized. That is,
on its own, and without any express words accompanying it, an act of
kinyan would affect an absolute discharge30; at the same time, a ‘bare’
renunciation, unaccompanied by an act of kinyan, requires support, in
language, circumstances, or both, to ascertain its validity and scope31.
Against this background, Tosafot first endeavours to determine the
exact fact situation with respect to which the Gemara discussion takes
place. He starts by ruling out two settings, in which the answer,
according to him, ought to be obvious, and hence not to give rise to
any disputation. These are to be referred to below as Tosafot’s two
‘obvious’ settings32. The first setting is where the worker, in agreeing
to be paid by the paymaster, explicitly releases the employer, even in
the case the paymaster will not pay. This is a case of an unqualified
renunciation, unequivocally stated. The second setting is that of a
limited renunciation, namely, when the worker, in agreeing to be paid
by the paymaster, explicitly makes the release or discharge of the
employer contingent or conditional on, actual payment by the
paymaster. In Tosafot’s view, it is obvious that recourse is not
available to the worker in the first setting, that of an express absolute
release of the employer by the worker; it is however equally obvious
according to him that recourse is available, upon the default of the
paymaster, in the second setting, that of an express conditional release
28

“Kinyan” literally means property or acquisition. In Jewish law, as a Halakhic
concept, an act of kinyan is a formal procedure to render an agreement legally
binding. Acts of kinyan include pulling, transferring, controlling, lifting or
exchanging an article. See in general: STEINSALTZ, The Talmud: A Reference Guide,
supra n.1, p.254. For a proprietary act for the transfer of ownership see: Talmud,
Kiddushin, pp.22B, 25B-26A and Bava Batra, p.84B.
29
Which is in line with Talmud, Kiddushin, p.16A, cited by TOSAFOT in Talmud,
Bava Metzia, p.112A. Hereafter, “TOSAFOT” is to mean Tosafot’s editor.
30
Ibid.
31
To that end, an act of kinyan serves as an indication to the firm resolution, without
which an undertaking is not binding and is revocable; in the absence of such an act,
the firm resolution is to be evidenced by other extrinsic circumstances. Cf. S.ALBECK,
The Law of Property and Contract in the Talmud, Jerusalem 1976, 1983, p.114-115
[in Hebrew]. The binding effect of a promise is the theme of B.LIFSHITZ, Promise:
Obligation and Acquisition in Jewish Law, Jerusalem 1988 [in Hebrew].
32
TOSAFOT, D’H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia p.112A.
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of the employer by the worker. In connection with both ‘obvious’
settings, the existence or absence of recourse is made dependent on
the express terms of the worker’s agreement to be paid by the
paymaster.
Accepting the premise of a scenario involving the extension of
credit by the paymaster to the employer, and adhering to his implicit
assumption as to the centrality of the worker’s consent to the direction
by the employer, Tosafot then proceeds to lay down two alternative
sub-scenarios in which the recourse controversy could arise33. The
first sub-scenario is that of a worker, who agrees to be paid by the
paymaster, so as to indicate his reliance on the paymaster’s
undertaking to pay34, without expressly specifying to the employer
whether the employer is thereby released, and if so, under what
conditions, namely whether the release, if any, is absolute or
conditional. The second alternative sub scenario laid down by Tosafot
is that of an express renunciation by the worker of his recourse against
the employer, on the condition of payment made by the paymaster.
The first sub-scenario is that of renunciation implied from the
reliance on the paymaster. In discussing it, Tosafot is cognizant of the
general rule that applies in the absence of a deposit or loan owed to
the instruction giver by the one who is instructed to pay to a
designated payee. Then, the one who is instructed to pay may revoke
his promise to pay the payee designated in the instruction; this is so
even when such promise was given in the presence of all three35. True,
Tosafot concedes, this revocability rule appears to apply to the
promise of the paymaster (the one who is instructed to pay) who,
having agreed to pay the creditor-payee/worker, is to extend credit to
the debtor-employer/instruction giver; nevertheless, in the context of
the first sub-scenario, and without necessarily limiting our scenario

33

A third sub-scenario, under which the recourse does not relate to the underlying
debt owed to the worker, but rather to the remedy for the violation of the prohibition
against delaying payment, is not relevant to the present discussion and is thus not
elaborated here.
34
In fact, it is not all that clear as to whether in this sub-scenario the worker is to
expressly advise the employer of his exclusive reliance on the paymaster. In my view,
TOSAFOT’S analysis of this scenario also applies to the case in which the worker
agreed to go to the paymaster without specifically stating that he relies on to the
paymaster.
35
Talmud, Gitin, p.13B.
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only to circumstances wherein all three are present in one location36,
Tosafot rejects the application of this revocability rule. Rather, in
Tosafot’s view, an absolute release of the employer by the worker is
possible in the context of the first sub-scenario when the paymaster
assumes, towards the worker, a binding and irrevocable obligation,
guarantying that of the employer; at that point, the paymaster is taken
to advise the worker to rely entirely on him and release the employer.
It is on the basis of this guarantee that the worker’s statement,
expressly made to the employer as to the worker’s own reliance on the
paymaster, is taken to implicitly renounce the worker’s recourse right
against the employer.
Tosafot is however unclear as to the language required to generate
an implied paymaster’s guarantee. Rather, he uses a word37 that could
mean either that the paymaster caused the worker to be next or close
to him, or that the paymaster caused the worker to rely upon him.
Having so caused the worker, the paymaster became “as if saying” to
the worker “rely on me and release the employer”.
Both the binding effect of an oral guarantee, unsupported by an act
of kinyan, and the absolute discharge it may confer to the employer,
are derived from discussions elsewhere in the Talmud38. First, the
Talmud considers the satisfaction derived by the guarantor from
seeing he is deemed by the creditor trustworthy as adequate to
produce the guarantor’s binding commitment 39.
36

This is so since TOSAFOT specifically speaks of the revocability or the paymaster’s
promise even (and not only) when given in the presence of all three.
37
In Hebrew, in English transliteration, ‘his-mi-cho’.
38
Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173A-174A.
39
See statement by Rav Ashi in Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173B. This however falls
short of rationalizing the effectiveness of an implied (as opposed to express)
guarantee, as undertaken by the paymaster in our case. In any event, no similar
satisfaction can be derived where the debtor already owes the guarantied sum to the
creditor, such as when, notwithstanding ALBECK, The Assignment of Debt in the
Talmud, supra n.13, as discussed in n.13, n.21 and n.23, the paymaster owed the sum
to the employer. The satisfaction derived by the paymaster in our scenario is
discussed in the paragraph that follows the next one. For the impact of satisfaction as
a mode of either acquisition or binding obligation see Y.FRIEDMAN, Satisfaction and
Property in the Talmud (1972-5732), 3 Deinney Yisrael 115 [in Hebrew]. For the
binding effect of a guarantee on the basis of satisfaction, in light of the apparent no
binding effect for a bare promise, see comprehensive discussion by LIFSHITZ,
Promise: Obligation and Acquisition in Jewish Law, supra n.31, p.1-117 (Chapter 1
dealing with promise) and p.187-279 (Chapter 3 dealing with the guarantee).
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Second, an ordinary guarantor is secondarily liable; he is
answerable to the creditor only where the creditor is unable to collect
from the principal debtor. To that end, the giving of the guarantee
does not usually release the principal debtor from his primary
liability; yet, there are exceptions to this rule.40 The one exception in
which the debtor is completely discharged 41 is where the guarantor
physically took the money from the lender and passed it on to the
debtor; in such a case, the guarantor is regarded as the principal
debtor, and the borrower receives an absolute discharge; in fact, he
has never been even liable to the lender, but rather only to the
guarantor42. Presumably43, what Tosafot is to be taken to mean, is that
in our case, the paymaster is to be regarded as if he took money from
the worker in order to pass it on to the employer who had never been
liable directly to the worker44. The paymaster’s obligation is then

40

Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173A-174A.
Other exceptions affect the sequence of recovery, namely, cover circumstances in
which the creditor may or is to recover first from the guarantor, rather than from the
debtor, who nevertheless remains liable.
42
The five categories into which a guarantee may fall are explained by TOSAFOT in
Talmud, Bava Batra, p.173B. The category under which the guarantor becomes a
primary debtor and the principal (original) debtor is fully discharged is that of a ‘nosé ve-noten ba-yad’, literally translated as “carries [the money from the lender] and
gives [it] by hand [to the borrower]”. For a more detailed definition of ‘no-sé venoten ba-yad’ see B.KAHANA, Guarantee, Jerusalem1991, p.95-101 [in Hebrew].
TOSAFOT points out that even in such a case, the borrower-principal debtor, who
remains liable to the guarantor (who is liable to the lender-creditor), may find himself
liable directly to the lender-creditor, though only in circumstances under which the
guarantor cannot pay the lender-creditor; this could happen under what is known as
“Rabbi Nathan’s lien” (see e.g. Talmud, Kiddushin, p.15A). That lien applies where
A owes to B who owes to C, in which case, C may recover directly from A, but only
where he (C) cannot collect from B. Yet, this is a matter of enforcement by C
(creditor-worker) of the debt owed to him by B (the paymaster-guarantor) by
resorting to the security of the debt owed by A (the employer-principal debtor) to B
(the paymaster-guarantor); by itself this is not a matter of A (the employer-principal
debtor) being directly liable to C (the creditor-worker).
43
That point, namely, the basis for the primary nature of the paymaster’s guarantee
undertaking, has not been discussed by commentators.
44
The position of a guarantor who, for all intents and purposes, replaces the debtor
who was originally liable, is in fact addressed by the sources, but only in the case of a
guarantee by a Jew for a loan taken from a non-Jew on which interest (which is
forbidden for a debt owed by one Jew to another) is payable by the Jewish borrower.
Such a guarantor is called ‘shlof-dotz’. See KAHANA, Guarantee, supra n.42, p.92-93.
For the origins of the expression see RASHI in Talmud, Yevamot 109B D”H Shalzion.
41
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primary, and not secondary or dependent on a co-extensive principal
obligation of the employer45.
In effect, the dispensation with an act of kinyan to support the
irrevocability of the guarantee obligation appears to be consistent with
the absolute discharge of the employer in the particular case of a
guarantee given by the paymaster. Thus, in the usual case of a
guarantee given for a loan, the binding effect of the guarantee is on
the basis of the guarantor’s satisfaction derived from the reliance on
him, so as to dispense with the kinyan requirement 46. On its own terms
this rationale is limited to circumstances where the guarantee was
given prior to the disbursement of funds to the borrower by the
lender;47 in such a case, the disbursement of funds is the act done in
reliance on the guarantee, which thus gives the guarantor the required
satisfaction. In contrast, when the guarantee is given after the loan
was disbursed, it cannot be said that the giving of the loan was on the
basis of the guarantee, so as to give the guarantor the required
satisfaction.
The broad principle is then that for a guarantee to bind without an
act of kinyan, the guarantor is to derive satisfaction from ‘something’
done, or omitted to be done, by the creditor, in reliance on the
guarantee. In our scenario, the debtor-employer is to be seen as
already owing the debt to the creditor-worker; he also risks violation
against the prohibition against delaying wages to the worker; hence,
there is no satisfaction derived by the guarantor-paymaster, other than
from seeing that on the basis of his guarantee, the worker-creditor is
releasing the debtor-employer who is consequently positioned not to
violate the prohibition against delaying payment.48 To that end, the
45

Which is the case for an ordinary guarantee. See Talmud, Bava Batra at 173B and
TOSAFOT, supra n.42. However, primary obligation is not necessary autonomous,
namely free of defences available to the employer against the worker; it does not
follow from the primary nature of the paymaster’s obligation that the paymaster is
liable even if the worker has not performed under his contract of employment. Stated
otherwise, it may nevertheless be an obligation to pay against the worker’s
performance to the employer.
46
Supra n.39, per Rav Ashi.
47
Talmud, Bava Batra, p.176B.
48
Even where the guarantee is given prior to the tasks to be performed by the worker
under his contract of employment with the employer, as speculated below in §2.e in
text around n.81, it may be far fetched to suppose that as a general rule the worker
(creditor) agreed to work for the employer (debtor) only in reliance of the
paymaster’s guarantee, so as to give the paymaster the required satisfaction.
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absolute discharge of, or loss of recourse against, the employer by the
worker, is the ‘something’ happening on the basis of the paymaster’s
guarantee, so as to give him the satisfaction which dispenses the act of
kinyan49.
As recalled, the disputation between Rav Shesheth and Rabbah is
on the continued liability of the employer. According to Rav
Shesheth, no recourse is available so that the employer is released.
Conversely, in Rabbah’s view, recourse is available so that the
employer remains liable. The first alternative sub-scenario involves an
implied absolute renunciation on the basis of the assumption of a
guarantor’s liability by the paymaster. In this context, the disputation
is as to whether, upon the default in payment of the paymaster,
recourse against the employer is available to the worker, who did not
specifically attach any condition to his agreement to be paid by the
paymaster. Rav Shesheth appears to endorse both the guarantee’s
undertaking of the paymaster and its falling into the category under
which the primary debtor (the employer) receives an absolute
discharge; he further seems to be of the view that the worker’s
implied renunciation is fully effective. Conversely, it is not all that
obvious from Tosafot whether Rabbah‘s view is premised on a
rejection of the guarantee’s theory, disapproval of the treatment of the
guarantee as falling into the category under which the principal debtor
is discharged, or else, on deeming an implied renunciation as
inadequate to generate a discharge.
As further indicated 50, the second alternative sub-scenario laid
down by Tosafot is that of an express renunciation by the worker of
his recourse against the employer, on the condition of payment made
49

Granted, any impact on the worker’s recourse from the employer on the basis of the
paymaster’s guarantee, even short of total loss of recourse, would have given the
guarantor-paymaster the required satisfaction. For example, conditional discharge,
effectively reversing the sequence of liability, so as to allow or require the creditorworker to first attempt to recover from the guarantor-paymaster, and to pursue
recovery from the debtor-employer only upon the default by the paymaster, would
have allowed the guarantor-paymaster to derive satisfaction. Hence, dispensation of
kinyan on the basis of derived satisfaction explains why in our scenario the
paymaster’s undertaking is not an ordinary guarantee, in which the guarantor is
secondary liable; yet it does not explain why in our scenario this is necessarily a
guarantee of the type in which the debtor is absolutely discharged and the guarantor
becomes the sole debtor. The point is not discussed by commentators and will not be
further addressed here.
50
Above, text that follows n.34.
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by the paymaster. Contrary to the renunciation under the first
alternative sub-scenario, which is absolute but implied, renunciation
under the second alternative sub-scenario is conditional yet express.
Thereunder, the worker reserves the recourse right against the
employer in the case of default or non-payment by the paymaster.
Also, unlike in the case of the first sub-scenario, which involves the
guarantee undertaking of the paymaster, nothing is stated in the
context of the second sub-scenario, on the existence or absence of an
undertaking by the paymaster.
As pointed out, other than expressly adding the reservation of the
right to go after the employer upon the default by the paymaster, the
second sub-scenario is very much like the second ‘obvious’ setting of
Tosafot, that of an express renunciation, conditional upon payment by
the paymaster. In that latter setting Tosafot pointed out that it is
obvious that on its own stated terms recourse is available to the
worker against the employer upon the default in payment by the
paymaster51. This observation appears to be fully applicable to the
second alternative sub-scenario, so that in its context there is no
disputation on this point; rather, in Tosafot’s view, in the context of
the second alternative sub-scenario, the disputation between Rav
Shesheth and Rabbah is whether recourse from the employer is
available to the worker even in the absence of default by the
paymaster.
In effect, the disputation is then as to whether conditional release
or discharge works; according to Rav Shesheth, conditional discharge
is effective so that no recourse is available to the worker against the
employer, as long as the paymaster has not defaulted. Conversely,
Rabbah’s view appears to be that recourse is available
notwithstanding the conditional release. Stated otherwise, Rabbah’s
position is that conditional release does not work, so that the employer
remains liable notwithstanding the worker’s agreement to be directed
to the paymaster, in which case recourse against the employer is
available to the worker throughout, namely also before, and not only
after, the paymaster’s default.
No explanation is immediately discernible from the discussion by
Tosafot to highlight the different conclusions of the sages as applied
to the second sub-scenario. Both are stated to agree that an oral
51

Ibid.
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explicit renunciation is effective on its own terms; certainly, Rav
Shesheth’s view is premised on this position. What is unclear then is
on what grounds Rabbah does not apply this principle in the context
of the second sub-scenario.
c. Other Commentators - Elaborating Tosafot’s Discussion

Having accepted the premise of a scenario dealing with the
extension of credit by the paymaster to the employer, commentators
focus on the availability of recourse by the worker from the employer
in the context of the two sub-scenarios of Tosafot. Overall, their
discussion is on three levels. First, it endeavours to fill in blanks in
Tosafot’s analysis. Second, the discussion purports to determine
which is actually the sub-scenario discussed in the Gemara, namely
whether it is of an implied absolute discharge or express conditional
discharge. Third and last, commentators aim to rule as to which of the
two sages’ positions regarding the availability to the worker of
recourse from the employer, is to prevail. As recalled, recourse is to
be precluded according to Rav Shesheth and available according to
Rabbah.
In connection with the first sub-scenario (an implied absolute
discharge based on reliance on the paymaster’s undertaking), Nimukei
Yoseph 52 explains the binding effect or irrevocability of the implied
guarantee liability of the storekeeper or moneychanger as premised on
the nature of his calling. Stated otherwise, the storekeeper, as a trader,
or the moneychanger, who deals with money, are to be taken to be
unable to revoke their undertaking, and be bound by it, even in the
absence of a loan or deposit owed by either of them to the employer.
In the view of Nimukei Yoseph, both Rav Shesheth and Rabbah are to
be taken to be in agreement on that premise, that of the binding effect,
or irrevocability, of the payment obligation of the paymaster to the
worker.
Nimukei Yoseph does not discuss the possibility of a disagreement
between Rav Shesheth and Rabbah as to the nature of the guarantee
undertaken by the paymaster, that is whether the guarantee is an
ordinary one, under which the employer is not discharged53, or of the
52

N.YOSEPH, D”H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68A (of Rif’s
page numbering).
53
Yet to allow recovery first from the guarantor-paymaster and only then from the
employer-debtor, the guarantee ought to be of the type ‘arev-kablan’. See TOSAFOT in
Talmud Bava Batra, p.73B, discussed supra in n.42. Cf. RASHI in Bava Metzia, p.62A
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category under which the guarantor is fully discharged. The former
classification would have supported Rabbah’s view that recourse is
available, while the latter classification would have supported Rav
Shesheth’s opinion that recourse is not available. Rather, according to
Nimukei Yoseph, the disputation evolves around the effectiveness of
an oral implied renunciation in reliance of the paymaster’s irrevocable
guaranty obligation. Thus, Rav Shesheth is of the view that a
renunciation implied from the worker’s explicit reliance on the
paymaster is fully effective so as to discharge the employer.
Conversely, Rabbah is of the opinion that to be effective to release the
employer, even in such circumstances, an express renunciation ought
to have been made by the worker.
It is however unclear whether according to Nimukei Yoseph the
two sages disagree on the adequacy of an implied renunciation in
general, or on to the facts of the case. To the latter end, Rav Shesheth
may be of the view that once there is a guarantee of the category
under which the borrower is not liable, no recourse against him is
available, and hence, no express renunciation of such recourse may be
needed; renunciation may simply be implied from the nature of the
guarantee relied upon. Conversely, Rabbah may be taken to draw a
distinction between two situations in which a guarantor becomes the
primary debtor. On one hand, there is the usual case of a borrower
who received the lender’s money through the guarantor, and who has
never been liable, so that no recourse has ever been available against
him. On the other hand, there is the case of the employer who was
liable to the worker in the first place, and who allegedly becomes
discharged due to the creditor’s reliance on the guarantee making the
guarantor the primary debtor. According to Rabbah then, while an
express renunciation is not needed in the former case, it is certainly
required in the latter.
Other commentators focus on the second sub-scenario (an explicit
conditional discharge of the employer by the worker, attached to the
worker’s agreement to be paid by the paymaster). In this context, an
express condition is attached to the worker’s agreement to be paid by
the paymaster; that condition, suspends the employer’s obligation
D”H Detanan, speaking of a guarantor who is an intermediary between the lender and
the borrower, namely a guarantor who is liable directly and unconditionally to the
lender and is entitled to recover from the borrower.
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until default of the paymaster. Right to recourse upon default is
however explicitly reserved. Commentators’ remarks mostly
endeavour to rationalize Rabbah’s position, effectively invalidating
this condition, by stating that notwithstanding such an express
condition, recourse from the employer is available to the worker
throughout, that is, even in the absence of, or prior to, default by the
paymaster. In other words, the employer had not been discharged,
even temporarily, and remained liable to the worker, irrespective of
the qualified or conditional renunciation expressed by the worker.
A common explanation given to Rabbah’s position, denying
efficacy to the release of the employer by the worker until default by
the paymaster, is premised on the revocability of the payment
obligation of the paymaster. According to the Rosh, the conditional
release given to the employer by the worker must be taken to be
mistaken, and thus not binding, since the payment obligation of the
paymaster is revocable54. The Mordechai strengthens the mistaken
release theory, by adding that the worker is aware of the employer’s
power to countermand payment, that is, to revoke the authority given
to the paymaster to pay, and thus cannot be taken to release the
employer, lest no one will remain liable to pay to him his wages 55. In
connection with the second sub-scenario, Rav Shesheth, denying
recourse, is taken to accept, at face value, the validity of the
employer’s release by the worker until default by the paymaster.
It is possible to view the analysis of first sub-scenario (an implied
renunciation on the basis of a guarantee) as premised on the
irrevocability of the paymaster’s obligation, with Rav Shesheth and
Rabbah disagreeing on the effect of an implied renunciation derived
from the reliance on that obligation. Conversely, in the context of the
second sub-scenario (an express discharge of the employer’s
obligation until default by the paymaster), Rabbah’s position,
invalidating the conditional discharge given by the worker to the
employer, is premised on the revocability of the paymaster’s
obligation. At the same time, in connection with the second subscenario, Rav Shesheth’s position, validating the express conditional
discharge, is consistent with both premises, that of revocability and
irrevocability of the paymaster’s obligation, or in fact, where there is
54
55

ROSH, D”H Ibaei lehu, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.
MORDECHAI, D”H Himchahu, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.
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no obligation altogether on the part of the paymaster. In other words,
if release of the employer is effective even when the substituting
promise of paymaster is revocable, release ought also to work in the
comparable case of absence of a commitment; furthermore, it is
obvious that release ought to be effective in the easier case in which
the substituting promise is irrevocable.
Not all aspects of the discrepancy between the two Tosafot’s subscenarios, as subsequently analyzed by commentators, are entirely
obvious. Indeed, per Tosafot, in the first sub-scenario, renunciation is
absolute though implied; in the second sub-scenario it is conditional
yet express. This indeed is an obvious factual discrepancy. However,
per Tosafot, in the first sub-scenario, the paymaster’s undertaking is
in the form of an implied guarantee; at the same time, neither the
existence of a paymaster’s undertaking, nor its absence, is stated in
the second sub-scenario 56. On their part, commentators57 strictly
followed Tosafot as to the renunciation point; yet, in preferring
Rabbah’s position to that of Rav Shesheth as to the availability of
recourse in the second sub-scenario, commentators discussed the
irrevocability of the paymaster’s undertaking; thereby, they filled in a
blank in Tosafot’s second sub-scenario, by adding an undertaking
given by the paymaster.
In the context of the second sub-scenario, that of an express
conditional discharge, commentators thus agree with Rabbah that in
the absence of a paymaster’s binding undertaking, recourse is
available to the worker against the employer. Unfortunately, it is not
obvious if they are to be taken to reject the possibility of an implied
irrevocable guarantee by the paymaster, on which Rav Shesheth and
Rabbah appear to agree in the context of the first sub-scenario 58; in
such a case, there is a discrepancy in the legal analysis of the two subscenarios. Alternatively, having accepted in principle the possibility
of an implied irrevocable guarantee given by the paymaster in the
second sub-scenario, such commentators may be taken to assert that
in the facts of the second sub-scenario, required language, or perhaps
any other condition, for the guarantee, have not been met. If the latter,
discrepancy on the point is merely factual; an implied irrevocable
56

Above, text that follows n.34.
See e.g. ROSH, supra n.54 and N.YOSEPH, supra n.52.
58
See text above around n.37.
57
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guarantee is then said to exist in the first sub-scenario but not in the
second one; in such a case, however, Tosafot’s absence of discussion
on the language or circumstances required for the implied guarantee is
mostly unfortunate, as there is no indication whatsoever as to the
circumstances under which an implied guarantee will arise under the
first sub-scenario, as opposed to an irrevocable undertaking under the
second sub-scenario.
Final ruling in Jewish law appears to treat the Bava Metzia
narrative as relating to the second sub-scenario (an express
conditional discharge pending default by the paymaster). As well,
final ruling in Jewish law appears to side with Rabbah’s position as to
the lack of validity of the conditional discharge, which allows the
worker to have his recourse against the employer throughout, namely,
even prior to and irrespective of default by the paymaster. The
rationale given is that of the revocability of the paymaster’s
obligation, such revocability being premised on the absence of any
deposit or loan owed by the paymaster to the employer59. This may be
taken to reject as a matter of law the binding effect of the implied
guarantee also per the first sub-scenario, and thereby to harmonize the
treatment of the two sub-scenarios, with both taken to be premised, as
a matter of law, on the revocability of the paymaster’s obligation.
d. Which Scenario? – Aspects of Tosafot’s Analysis Revisited

The acceptance of Rabbah’s premise (recourse is available
irrespective and prior to default) and reasoning (mistaken
renunciation) in the context of the second sub-scenario (an express
discharge conditional on payment by the paymaster) may appear to
reopen Tosafot’s ruling on the two initial settings, in which the
answer was supposed to be ‘obvious60’. The first setting was where
the worker, in agreeing to be paid by the paymaster, explicitly
released the employer, even in the case the paymaster would not pay.
The second setting was that when the worker, in agreeing to be paid
by the paymaster, explicitly made the release or discharge of the
employer contingent or conditional on actual payment by the
paymaster. In Tosafot’s view, it was ‘obvious’ that recourse was not
available to the worker in the first setting, that of an express absolute
59

See TUR, Choshen Mishpat, Section 339 and SHULCHAN A RUCH, Choshen Mishpat,
Section 339.
60
Above §2.b, particularly text around n.32.
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release of the employer by the worker; it was equally ‘obvious’ that
recourse was available, upon non-payment or default by the
paymaster, in the second setting, that of an express conditional release
of the employer by the worker. In both such cases, the existence or
absence of recourse was made dependent on the express renunciation
included in the worker’s agreement to be paid by the paymaster.
Yet, at first blush, if the paymaster’s obligation is revocable so that
the worker’s attempted expressly stated conditional release fails as a
mistaken release, per Rabbah’s view in the context of the second subscenario, it is hard to see why the express absolute discharge of the
employer, per the first setting dismissed by Tosafot as ‘obvious’, will
work better. Stated otherwise, arguably, discharge ought to be taken
to be mistaken, and hence ineffective, not only when it is conditional
(Rabbah’s view for the second sub-scenario) but also, and in fact
more so, when it is absolute (Tosafot’s first ‘obvious’ setting); that is,
if the obligation of the paymaster is revocable, an absolute discharge
will leave the worker with no remedy whatsoever upon the revocation
by the paymaster, as the worker may then be unable to go back and
recover from the employer. The absolute discharge must then be seen
as mistaken and invalid. Hence, the acceptance of Rabbah’s premise
and reasoning in the context of the second sub-scenario may result in
the reversal of the ‘obvious’ conclusion reached by Tosafot for the
first initial setting presented by him.
True, as suggested by Nimukei Yoseph 61, Rabbah may still be seen
as agreeing to the validity of an absolute discharge based on the
irrevocable guarantee of the employer, but not to an absolute
discharge purportedly given in the absence of such a binding
undertaking. It is nevertheless possible to come up with an alternative
explanation to Tosafot’s position under which it is only the
renunciation in the second sub-scenario, but not in the first ‘obvious’
setting, which is mistaken and hence invalid. The key is Tosafot’s
view as to the meaning of a mistaken renunciation, which emerges
from another part of his same discussion on the Bava Metzia text,
dealing with a related matter. Thus, in Tosafot’s view, to be effective,
renunciation given as part of a compromise or settlement of a
monetary dispute cannot be oral and requires an act of kinyan62; this is
61
62

Supra, n.52.
See above text at n.28-31.
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so, since the party who would have won in court would not have
settled had he known he would have won. Stated otherwise, in
Tosafot’s view, mistaken renunciation is not only one based on
mistaken belief in the existence of a state of facts that actually does
not exist, but also one based on risk taken as to contingent facts.
On these grounds, it is only an oral conditional renunciation, as in
the second sub-scenario, but not an absolute one, as in the first
‘obvious’ setting, that can be viewed as mistaken; furthermore, per
this reasoning, a conditional renunciation is inherently, by its nature,
mistaken, since the existence of ‘conditions’ that may or may not be
met gives rise to uncertainty, on which an oral renunciation cannot be
based free of error. Arguably then, commentators who explain
Rabbah’s position under the second sub-scenario as premised on the
mistaken basis of the employer’s release by the worker adhere to
Tosafot’s expanded understanding of ‘mistake’ as covering
uncertainties due to contingencies63.
There may also be an apparent contradiction between Rabbah’s
position as to the second sub-scenario and Tosafot’s view as to the
second ‘obvious’ setting. Thus, Rabbah’s position for the second subscenario invalidates the worker’s explicit undertaking to discharge the
employer until default in payment by the paymaster. Consequently,
the worker’s recourse from the employer is not to commence upon the
default in payment by the paymaster, as may be under Tosafot’s
second initial ‘obvious’ setting. In that setting, the employer’s
discharge is explicitly made by the worker contingent or conditional
on actual payment by the paymaster. Rather, in Rabbah’s view with
regard to the second sub-scenario, recourse from the employer is to be
available to the worker throughout, irrespective of his agreement to be
paid by the paymaster. Hence, the acceptance of Rabbah’s premise
and reasoning for the second sub-scenario results in either the
reversal, or the bypassing of the significance, of Tosafot’s ‘obvious’
conclusion as to the second initial setting; if the employer is not
discharged prior to the default by the paymaster, there is no
63

For such commentators see above, text and n.54-55. Compare and contrast with
Bava Metzia, p.66B-67A, discussing the avoidance of an obligation incurred on the
basis of either mistaken renunciation, or in the belief that a stated condition thereto
will not be fulfilled, in which context ‘mistake’ is more conventionally understood to
refer to the mistaken belief in the existence of a state of fasts (or law) that actually
doe not exist.
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employer’s liability to be incurred upon the default by the paymaster.
Stated otherwise, if the express discharge of the employer until
default by the paymaster is ineffective so that the employer remains
liable throughout, per Rabbah’s position for the second sub-scenario,
liability of the employer cannot be seen as triggered by the default by
the paymaster, as may Tosafot’s ‘obvious’ conclusion for the second
initial setting be understood to state.
In the final analysis however, Tosafot’s conclusions for both the
second ‘obvious’ setting and the second sub-scenario are reconcilable;
both involve the same stipulation by the worker, namely that of
conditional renunciation upon payment; what is added in the second
sub-scenario, namely, an express reservation of recourse upon nonpayment, is in fact a double stipulation,64 which ought to be taken as
implied also in the second ‘obvious’ setting. For the second obvious
setting, Tosafot is to be taken to say only that is clear that per the
language expressing the renunciation, recourse is available upon nonpayment; Tosafot is not to be taken as implying anything then on the
availability of recourse prior to that, a point which he subsequently
discussed in the context of the second sub-scenario, on which the
views of Rabbah and Rav Shesheth vary.
e. Talmudic Text in Shevuot - Tosafot’s Position Supported

Support to Tosafot’s position as to the centrality of the
renunciation issue and insight on whether the Bava Metzia narrative
requires the presence of all three65 may be derived by comparison to
another Talmudic text, in Shevuot 66. The situation dealt with there is
that of a charge in the books or ledger of a storekeeper arising from a
payment or sale made in alleged compliance by the storekeeper with
an instruction given by a person; such an instruction was to provide
wheat to the instruction giver’s son or small-value coins to his worker.
The Mishna discusses a case in which the worker and the storekeeper
disagree as to whether the storekeeper complied. It rules that
whenever the worker denies receipt of payment claimed to be made
64

A double stipulation states both the positive and negative side of an obligation; it is
a condition stating both what will happen upon its compliance and upon its breach.
See Talmud, Kidduhsin, p.61A.
65
A question left open in text around n.20 above. For the renunciation of recourse as
central to Tosafot’s position see §2.b above.
66
Talmud, Shevuot, p.45A, and Jerusalem Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B, discussed
immediately below.
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by the storekeeper, the employer is to pay to both, that is, to the
storekeeper and the worker67. This continued liability of the employer
means the availability of recourse to the worker against him.
Two points ought to be highlighted. First, the text in Shevuot does
not raise the issue of recourse by the worker against the employer; it
appears to take its existence for granted. Second, the Bava Metzia
narrative does not even refer to the Shevuot text; yet, it could have
been expected that Rabbah would rely on the Shevuot discussion as
supporting the availability of recourse and that Rav Shesheth would
endeavour to distinguish it so as to justify lack of recourse according
to his own analysis. It seems then that it was obvious to all concerned
that the two Talmudic texts do not deal with the same scenario;
indeed, in the Bava Metzia text the direction given by the employer is
addressed to the worker, namely to the creditor, to go and recover
from the paymaster. Conversely, in Shevuot, the direction is given by
the employer to the paymaster, to pay to the worker. And while either
way a double direction from the employer is required, the one to the
worker to go and get paid, and the other to the paymaster to pay, the
emphasis in each scenario on one direction is not without
implications.
Thus, the issue of renunciation, with which Tosafot’s analysis to
the Bava Metzia narrative is concerned, is a matter coming up
between the employer and the worker; it arises in a scenario involving
them both, as when the employer directs the worker to go to the
paymaster. At the same time, no renunciation comes up in that part of
the scenario in which the worker is not involved, that of the direction
given by the employer to the paymaster, as in Shevuot. By itself, the
direction dealt with in Shevuot neither entitles nor binds the worker,
67

For this interpretation see PNEI MOSHE commentary to the Jerusalem Talmud,
Shevout (Talmud p.36B) and to a similar end, in the Talmud, Kiddushin, p.43B. There
is a disputation in the Mishna in Shevuot (p.45A in the Bavli Talmud; p.36B in the
Jerusalem Talmud), irrelevant for our purposes, as to whether to be successful in their
claims against the employer, both the worker and the storekeeper need take an oath.
As well, note that the Talmudic discussion in Shevuot equally covers the father and
son scenario, and not only that of the employer and worker, to which attention is
restricted in the present discussion. Yet, it will be noted that the initial entitlement of
the son from the father, unlike that of the worker from the employer, is not all that
obvious. Arguably, the father and son case is relevant only to the oath taking aspect
of the text, and is not to be taken as implying father’s liability to his son. See
TOSAFOT YOM TOV, D”H Ten livni, commenting on Mishna, Shevuot, Section 7, Rule
5.
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who thus remains entitled to recover from the employer at any time. It
is in fact the absence of any modification in the worker’s rights on
which the Shevuot text focuses. Conversely, in the Bava Metzia text, it
is the worker’s consent, to abide to the employer’s direction, which is
determinative; hence, it is only then that the issue of the modification
of his rights, in the form of renunciation or loss of recourse, arises.
Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud, the Gemara in Shevuot limits the
case dealt with by the Mishna, that of the direction addressed to the
storekeeper, to a situation where the instruction is not given in the
presence of all three. It is only then, that is, when the worker is not
even present at the time the instruction is given by the employer to the
storekeeper, that the employer remains liable to the worker.
Conversely, where all three are present at the time the instruction is
given, that is, when the worker has been present, the Gemara in the
Jerusalem Talmud categorically states, the employer has been
discharged and recourse is available to the worker only against the
storekeeper68.
Obviously then, in holding that the storekeeper is liable and cannot
renege69, the Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud envisages a case in
which the storekeeper undertook to pay. The Ridvaz takes the position
that in such a case it is “as if” the storekeeper owed money to the
employer who had paid him in advance; yet in fact, no advance had
actually been made and even without a debt owed by the storekeeper
to the employer, the employer is discharged, and the storekeeper may
not renege. Mareh Hapanim is of the same opinion; in his view the
case, dealt with by the Jerusalem Talmud is one in which the
storekeeper extends credit to the employer, which is the same as in the
Bava Metzia text. In the view of Mareh Hapanim, the Gemara in the
Jerusalem Talmud thus appears to follow Rav Shesheth, who in his
68

Talmud, Shevuot, p.36B-37A. The Gemara text distinguishes between a situation in
which the employer “did not make the worker stand [before the storekeeper] with
him”, namely with the employer, in which case there is recourse, and the situation in
which the employer “made the worker stand [before the storekeeper] with him”,
namely the employer, in which case there is no recourse. PNEI MOSHE and RIDVAZ on
the Gemara page are more explicit in characterizing the latter situation, in which
recourse is lost, as involving the presence of all three.
69
As PNEI MOSHE explains the Gemara text in the Jerusalem Talmud, in such a case,
the risk falls on the storekeeper, who cannot get away by directing the workers to the
employer who had been released, regardless of whether payment by the storekeeper is
disputed or not made.
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controversy with Rabbah in Bava Metiza precludes recourse against
the employer; yet, per Mareh Hapanim, ultimately, “the law is not
according to him”, but rather, according to Rabbah, who permits
recourse against the employer.
It thus emerges that in the footsteps of the Bava Metzia scenario,
the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud deals with a case in
which credit is extended by the paymaster/storekeeper to the
employer. Indeed, in fastening liability on the storekeeper and
discharging the employer, the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem
Talmud may well be at variance with “the law” as subsequently
prevailed; what matters to us however is that in distinguishing itself
from the Shevout Mishna the Shevout Gemara in the Jerusalem
Talmud contrasts that Mishna with the Bava Metzia scenario, by
envisaging the latter to apply where all three are present together.
Among the early commentators, both Rif70 and the Rosh 71 are quite
explicit in relying on the Shevuot Gemara in the Jerusalem Talmud as
the basis for their own respective treatment of Rav Shesheth’s
position on the loss of recourse in the Bava Metzia’s narrative, and
viewing that position as confined to a situation where all three are
present72. In the Rosh’s view, this position is further limited
specifically to the first of Tosafot’s sub-scenarios, that of the implicit
renunciation by the worker based on the paymaster’s the guarantee.
Tosafot’s commentary to the Bava Metiza text is more ambiguous73;
in dealing with that first sub-scenario, he mentions the revocation
power of the paymaster who does not owe anything to the employer
and states it to exist “even in the presence of all three”; he later on
mentions the Jerusalem Talmud Gemara in Shevuot to refute the
possibility that the Bava Metzia text, instead of dealing with a
recourse against the employer, is actually concerned with a third subscenario, that of the reinstatement of the worker’s remedy for the
violation of the prohibition against delaying payment 74.

70

RIF on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.68B (of RIF’S page numbering).
ROSH, supra n.54.
72
For Rav Shesheth’s position and a preliminary discussion on whether the Bava
Metzia narrative is confined to a case where all three are present together see above
§2.a.
73
TOSAFOT, D”H Chozer, commenting on Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.
74
For the third sub-scenario, see supra n.33.
71
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Among the later commentators, Kessef Mishna treats the
disputation in the Bava Metzia text as relating to whether, in order to
be effective, the worker’s renunciation in the presence of all three
must be express 75. This excludes the second sub-scenario of Tosafot,
that of an express conditional discharge; rather, this treatment must be
taken as limiting the disputation in the Bava Metzia text to the case of
the first Tosafot sub-scenario, that of the implicit renunciation on the
basis of the paymaster’s guarantee. It also points out at the Bava
Metzia text as further restricted to the situation that all three are
present.
Certainly, speaking of the direction given to the paymaster to pay
the worker, the text of the Mishna in Shevuot ought to be taken as not
purporting to affect the worker’s own rights; he is to obtain payment
of money and not a payment obligation from the paymaster, and is to
remain to be entitled to obtain payment in money solely from the
employer. Neither the accrual of a right against the paymaster nor the
loss of a right against the employer is to take place, and hence there is
no need for the presence of all three, or in fact, of any mechanism, to
create rights and duties.
At the same time, speaking of the direction given to the worker by
the employer to be paid by the paymaster, the Bava Metzia text ought
to be taken as positioning the worker as dealing with both the
employer and the paymaster. It is on the basis of what the paymaster
tells the worker that the worker is purporting to renounce the recourse
against the employer. This is particularly obvious in the first subscenario (an implied absolute discharge based on reliance on the
paymaster’s undertaking), in which renunciation is on the basis of the
paymaster’s guarantee to the worker. Strictly speaking, in the second
sub-scenario of Tosafot (express conditional discharge),
communication is a matter exclusively between the employer and the
worker76; hence, there is no pressing need to see it as confined to the
presence of all three scenario. Yet, as discussed, commentators treat
also the second sub-scenario as involving an undertaking by the
paymaster, albeit revocable77. Under this understanding, also the
75

RAMBAM, Kinyan: Hilchot Mechira, Section 6, Rule 8. On the renunciation in the
various settings and sub-scenarios of the Bava Metzia text see above §2.a.
76
See text above in §2.b that follows n.34 and n.50.
77
See above §2.c, particularly around n.57.
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second sub-scenario is to better be envisaged as involving the
presence of all three together.
Hence it is more plausible to see all three standing together; the
alternative is awkward: the worker, having received the direction from
the employer, is to go to the paymaster, and having received from him
an undertaking to pay, is now to return to the employer and make the
renunciation.
Indeed, the view under which the loss of recourse in the Bava
Metzia text is limited to circumstances where renunciation was made
in the presence of all three, may explain the paucity in the discussion
by commentators as to the mechanism under which instructions are to
direct the paymaster to pay the worker; certainly, if all three are
present, no issue arises as to formal writing requirements, flow of
communication, authentication of instructions or identification of the
worker.
On the other hand, if all three are present, it is not all that obvious
why the paymaster is not to pay promptly to the worker, but is rather
to undertake a deferred payment obligation, to be carried out at some
point in the future78. Indeed, a delay may be understood to occur in the
case of a paymaster-storekeeper, who is to extend credit by selling
provisions to the worker over time; it is less understandable in the
case of the paymaster-moneychanger who is to pay money to the
worker. This is particularly so if the paymaster is held bound by the
prohibition against delaying payment, from which the employer has
been released by virtue of the direction issued to the worker to obtain
payment from the paymaster79.
True, the Bava Metzia text may be taken to be limited to unusual
circumstances, such as where the moneychanger does not have
78

Which was clearly the case in the scenario described in the Gemara in Shevuot in
the Jerusalem Talmud, p.36B, supra n.66, in order to demonstrate a case in which the
workers have no recourse against the employer.
79
For the view that unless payment through the paymaster is agreed in advance, the
requirement to comply with the rule prohibiting delaying payment passes from the
employer to the paymaster see TOSEFTA on Talmud, Bava Metzia, Section 10, Rule 1.
On the compliance by the paymaster see ALBEK, Assignment of Debt, supra n.13,
p.276-277. His reasoning is valid even without accepting his position of the
paymaster’s pre-existing indebtedness to the employer, discussed in supra n.21 and
n.23 above. As recalled, the prohibition against delaying payment to the worker was
the main concern of the Mishna in the Bava Metzia narrative. See above, beginning of
§2.a.
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enough cash at hand, at least of the desired small coins, or else, the
entire meeting of all three occurs either late in the day, after of what
we may call today normal business hours, or not in the paymaster’s
place of business. This however may significantly reduce the
relevance of the discussion to ordinary circumstances; unless of
course moneychangers used to set a shop in the market but kept their
money, at least in part, particularly other than small change,
elsewhere, in which case customers with whom they transacted in the
market had often to come later to that other location to obtain their
money.
Another option, still adhering to the presence of all three setting, is
to treat the scenario as one in which the paymaster promptly pays the
worker, though not in cash, but rather in the form of agreeing to hold
with him an amount available to the worker, for full or partial
withdrawals, on demand. Under this view, the paymaster’s agreement
to hold the amount for the worker will serve as ‘payment’ in
compliance with the rule prohibiting delaying payment. In such a
case, the disputation between Rabbah and Rav Shesheth is on the
recourse available to the worker against the employer, as long as
actual payment in money has not been carried out. This may be a way
to see the Bava Metzia scenario as not limited to unusual
circumstances 80.
Perhaps a simpler explanation to the delay in anticipated payment
by the paymaster, while still requiring all three to be present, is to
treat the setting as one wherein the direction given to the worker by
the employer to get paid by the paymaster is given prior the end of the
working day, that is, prior the completion of the work, namely, before
the entitlement to payment accrues. Actual payment is then to be
made at the end of the day, upon the completion of work. Indeed, this
may explain the delay in payment by the paymaster; yet, this would
have made any undertaking of the paymaster conditional upon
completion of the work by the worker, for which we have no
indication in any of the texts or discussions81.
80

Nevertheless, under this view of the matter, attention ought to have been given to
the position of the employer who in reliance on the paymaster’s agreement may have
already paid him in whole or in part money to be kept for the worker; lack of a
discussion on the point strongly weakens this explanation to the delay.
81
The conditional order issue may further arise in connection with the view of the
TOSEFTA, supra n.79, under which the prohibition against delaying payment is
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Another possibility in the context of a rule requiring all three to be
present, is to treat the scenario as referring to the case of a worker
who completed his tasks in the course of the day, prior to its end, so
that there is still time between then and the point of time, at the end of
the day, in which the prohibition against delaying payment, will be
violated. In such a case, the paymaster’s obligation may be given
ahead of actual payment; in turn, actual payment is to take place
however prior to the end of the day, before the prohibition against
delaying payment is violated. While this fits the text, it is questionable
whether this is such a typical case to draw so much attention.
Nevertheless, the existence of a paymaster’s payment obligation
prior to actual payment is also not easily explained if the presence of
all three is dispensed with. Even if the worker is to go on his own to
the paymaster to demand payment, so that presence of all three is not
required, it is not clear why payment is not to be made on the spot,
and why instead the paymaster’s undertaking to pay in the future
arises. It could however be argued, though admittedly, quite
tenuously, that such could be the case in one of a few situations. First,
the case may fall into the second sub-scenario, as described by
Tosafot and not as ‘revised’ by commentators, in which no
undertaking is given by the paymaster. Second, in connection with the
first sub-scenario, the situation may be that in which there is a
standing obligation of the paymaster to pay to the employer’s workers
sent to him, in which case it is as if the paymaster actually spoke to
the worker advising him to rely on him, but in fact did not speak to
him directly a all. Third, a similar standing obligation can be
contemplated also by the commentators who read Tosafot’s second
sub-scenario as involving an undertaking, albeit revocable, of the
paymaster82. In each such a case the worker makes the renunciation,
whose effectiveness and scope is the subject of the discussion, prior to
coming to the paymaster.
In the final analysis, the simplest explanation to the paymaster’s
deferred payment obligation may however be that the worker is
violated by neither the employer nor the paymaster where payment through a
paymaster is agreed in advance. In such a case, however, at the initial stage of the
agreement, payment is instructed to be made conditional upon the completion of the
work, unless both the worker and paymaster are to be re-directed at its completion.
Texts do not discuss this ‘two-stage’ agreement followed by direction.
82
See above §§2.b and 2.c.
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content with the obligation of the paymaster to pay to him in the
future and does not demand immediate payment to which he is
entitled by virtue of the law prohibiting delay in the payment of
wages. This explanation holds true whether or not the worker’s
renunciation ought to be made in the presence of both the employer
and the paymaster. Indeed, the Gemara is quite explicit in stating that
the prohibition against delaying payment of wages is violated when
delay occurs notwithstanding the worker’s demand 83; that is, the clock
is ticking as of the demand only, and delay in payment is not
precluded if consented by the worker who foregoes the demand. The
presence-of-all-three setting may then prevail only as it appears to
better fit the transactional flow, and not because it gives a superior
explanation to the paymaster’s deferred payment obligation.
At the same time, for this explanation to be consistent with the role
of the storekeeper or moneychanger as a paymaster and not surety, in
line with the picture depicted by Rashi and adhered to throughout the
entire analysis above84, an actual payment, albeit delayed, in either
kind (by the storekeeper) or money (by the moneychanger), is to be
envisioned. Reasons and the extent for this delay, as well as the time
for the employer’s repayment to the paymaster, and any possible cost
incurred by him in connection with the operation of the mechanism85
are neither specified nor amenable to deduction from available
materials.
It seems that the Talmudic text primarily focused on the legal
implications of the renunciation in the various situations; no adequate
attention was given to the operation of the payment mechanism in
connection with which the renunciation is given. Unfortunately,
commentators have not addressed the time lag between the payment
obligation and payment itself, which could have shed more light and
provided greater understanding of the mechanism. Certainly however,
both the delay in actual payment, and as already indicated in §2.a, the
probable existence of a presence-of-all three requirement, reinforce
the view of the scenario as dealing with the credit extension by a
paymaster who does not owe money to the employer.
83

Talmud, Bava Metzia, p.112A.
See §2.a, text in paragraph preceding the one containing n.13, above.
85
Certainly, any such cost may not violate the prohibition to take interest mentioned
in supra n.4.
84
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3. Final Modern Lawyer’s Observations

Under modern law, a conditional discharge is implicitly given by
the payee-creditor (the worker) to the drawer-debtor (the employer),
in effect, of the type rejected by Rabbah in the context of the second
sub-scenario. Thus, under modern law, upon the taking the cheque, in
temporarily renouncing, or in effect suspending his right of recourse
against the drawer-creditor, the payee-creditor does not rely at all on
any undertaking or even representation emanating from the drawee
bank- paymaster86; rather, he exclusively counts on the contingent
liability of the drawer-debtor. Upon the dishonour of the cheque by
the drawee-paymaster, the drawer-debtor becomes liable on the
cheque87, and alternatively, on the basic transaction 88.
With respect to the second sub-scenario, that of an express
conditional discharge, modern law thus appears to be quite consistent
with Rav Shesheth’s position; per Tosafot’s text, such is the case
where no undertaking is given by the drawee-paymaster to the payeecreditor-worker. With respect to the first sub-scenario, that of an
implied absolute discharge, the irrevocable undertaking given by the
paymaster is not treated in modern law as a guarantee. It is either in
the form of a bank’s engagement on a certified or its own cheque, or
in the form of a letter of credit. The better view under modern law is
to see the former situation, that of the certification or the bank cheque,
as typically giving rise to an absolute renunciation by the payeecreditor (worker) of his recourse against his debtor (the employer), the
drawer of the certified cheque or the remitter of the bank cheque89.
This is in line with the position of Rav Shesheth under the first subscenario 90.
86

See for example in Canada, under the Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1985 c.B-4,
Section 126 (drawee is not liable on a bill unless he accepted it), as well as Section
130 (no liability on a bill without a signature). A ‘cheque’ is a specie of a bill. See
Section 165.
87
Ibid. Section 129(a). For dishonour by non-payment see Section 94. Alternatively
he also becomes liable on the debt or basic transaction for which the cheque was
given.
88
This is so since payment by cheque is presumed to be conditional. See Re Charge
Card Services Ltd. [1988], 3 All ER 702, p.707 (CA).
89
This is reflected e.g. in the US in UCC 3-414(c).
90
Conversely, the issue of the letter of credit is typically treated as conditional
payment, releasing the debtor only on the condition of payment by the paymaster, the
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Modern law departs from Rav Shesheth’s position in several
respects. First, it is obvious that no presence of all three is required;
the debtor-employer directs the creditor- worker to be paid by the
paymaster by either issuing his own cheque to the payee-worker, or
delivering to him a bank cheque issued by the paymaster. In turn, the
presentment of this instrument by the creditor-worker to the
paymaster constitutes the debtor-employer’s direction to the
paymaster to pay. Second, the scope of the renunciation is implied by
law, rather than in fact. In any given case, the presumption of either
conditional or absolute discharge can be rebutted; yet, the relevant
presumption arises without pursuing actual language and conduct of
parties. Third, payment by cheque is taken to occur at the time it was
accepted even in conditional payment, and not at the time it is actually
honoured91; the lag preceding actual payment does not pose any
problem. Fourth, while credit extension by the paymaster to the
creditor is quite conceivable, the typical situation, at least in which a
cheque is issued, is where the debtor’s funds are held with the
paymaster92. Fifth, a payment order must be written. It also must be
unconditional93; the modern lawyer cannot easily live with the
proposition that the paymaster’s payment obligation may depend on
the performance of the underlying contract by the payee-creditor,
which is one of the possible scenarios to explain the time lag between
the payment obligation and actual payment.
In conclusion, the mechanism discussed in the Bava Metzia
Talmudic text involves neither writing nor funds on deposit. It
involves a demand possibly made by the creditor on the paymaster
only in the presence of the debtor, and leaves recourse to be
continuously available to the debtor against the creditor.
issuer of the letter of credit. See WJ Alan & Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co
[1972] 2 All ER 127, p.136; [1972] 2 QB 189, 209.
91
As pointed out by MEGAW LJ in The Brimnes Tenax Steamship Co v. The Brimnes
(Owners) [1974] 3 All ER 88, 111-112 (CA).
92
The drawee bank’s contractual duty to pay is subject to the availability of either
funds in the drawer-customer’s account, or of an overdraft facility to him or her. See
Barclays Bank v. W.J. Simms 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 225 at p.238, [1980] QB 677 (Goff J.).
93
This is true for the cheque (see e.g. in Canada BEA supra n.86, Section 165(1) in
conjunction with Section 16(1)) and transfer order (see e.g. in the US UCC Section
4A-103(a)(1)(i). Cf. the letter of credit, with regard to which documentary (and no
other) conditions are to be specified. ICC UCP 600 for Documentary Credits (2007
Revision) Articles 2 (definitions of ‘credit’ and ‘presentation’) and 4-5.
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Notwithstanding the temptation to the contrary94, neither cheques nor
a cheque system are proven to have been envisioned by the Talmud in
connection with this mechanism. While the Bava Metzia Talmudic
text and related commentaries may have foreseen interesting
forthcoming issues, it is premature to treat these materials as
discussing cheques or containing a nascent cheque law.

94

As set out in supra n.3.
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